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A MODEL OF "APPLIEDETHICS" I N A MA TION SAFETY:
THE A WITIONSAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM

LaMarr Stanford and Willem Homan

Recently it was reparted in the popular news media that 25 San Diego State University students were caught cheating
on an ethics exam @tine, 1999). Internet sights like <www.schoolsucks.com>will sell you a canned essay for $19.97
(Ware, 1999). The President, trying to escape responsibility for a tawdry affair, blatantly lies to the country on national
television (Chen, 1998).As for aviation, imagine the following not-so-unrealistic scenarios involving airmen. The pilot
of a Boeing 747 over the mid-Atlantic, with 400+ passengers on board, descends through an assigned altitude and
narrowly misses another airliner flying below. The 747 crew, fearful of ramifications, remains silent about the mishap.
The other airplane's crew is unaware of their narrow brush with death, and since there is no radar coverage over the midAtlantic, the incident goes unreported A young aspiring pilot surreptitiously adds some fictitious "Parker Pen" flight time
in his logbook to obtain a job that requires more flight experience than he or she currently has.
The rational conclusion to all these events is that we are descending to the depths of a valueless nation. Situational
ethics and self-serving rationalizations of auy despicable situation seem to be not only accepted but expected. While this
atmosphere is tolerated in many areas of society, there are niches where public safety considerations make it imperative
that the substandard conduct of individuals in the system be exposed and corrected. The field of aviation safety is a prime
example.
SAFETY TRUTHS AND THE WALLS OF SILENCE
A monumental scientific truth has emerged over the last 50
years of analyzing aviation safety statistics. Aviation safety
experts have found that for every aviation accident there is a
large number of related incidents that precede a final
catastrophe. In other words, there are probably 500 near
misses for every mid-air collision. It follows that if the
aviation safety community can obtain a good sampling of
these incidents for analysis, it can reliably predict where
serious safety compromises may be developing and alert the
industry. Incident reporting is a crucial link in the safety
chain.
A current example of a serious safety concern emerging is
the pilots' use of computers and automation on the flight deck.
Airline pilots become very comfortable and dependent on
these marvelous gadgets; however, these devices do
experience failure and can be complex to program in a timecompressed situation. There is also a generation of senior
pilots who are not as conversant and adept at using t h s
cumputer-based technology interface as their junior co-pilots
(Wiener L Nagel, 1987). Furthermore, in recent years most
of the new generation airliners have changed fiom a threeperson flight crew to just two pilots, consequently making
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automation more critical than ever.
In the early 1970s, the aviation safety experts came to
another monumental but hstrating conclusion. Many of the
most informative and trend-setting incidents were not being
reported, and the safety benefits were not being passed on to
the aviation industry. The reason was simple. Incidents are
often the result of errors andlor questionable judgement of the
@ht crew. What crew member with a mortgage and a family
to support is going to voluntady divulge self-incriminating
information, even if it has serious safety consequences for
other aviators? In this environment, flight crews simply
remained silent and waited for the FAA or someone in the
airline management to discover the incident. Airline
management was often reluctant to report incidents as well. In
fact, management faced the same dilemma as the pilots,
namely the possibility of an FAA fine or some other sanction
as a result of the incident. The upshot of the matter was that
there was a wall of silence punctuated by the not too
infrequent sound of aluminum bending and smashing.
The whole incident reporting system was founded on
anfixcement or policing action taken by the FAA through the
use of informants and inspection procedures that often were
ineffective. Moreover, the nature of incident investigation
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often put the FAA and the aviation community in adversary
roles. The result was a c'them-versus-us" mentality that
impeded accurate incident reporting.
This situation set the stage for a deadly airline accident in
1974 (Shaw, 1974). The extent of the problem was painfully
brought home after a TWA Boeing 727 crashed into the side
of Round IW, Virginia on December 1, 1974. AU 92
passengers and crewmembers died instantly when the pilots
prematurely descended past the minimum safe altitude on a
mght approach into Dulles Airport (NTSB, 1975). During the
subsequent accident investigation, it was revealed that a
United Airlines crew had mistakenly taken the same course of
action on the same approach for the same runway just 6 weeks
earlier. At the last minute, the United crew was able to see its
mistake and take timely and safe corrective action. They
reported the incident to United Flight Operations who, for
obvious self-serving reasons, did not immediately pass it on
to the FAA. The rest is history. The National Transportation
and Safety Board, in its final report on the TWA 5 14 accident
and the preceding United incident, stated:
In retrospect, the Board finds it most unfortunate
that an incident of this nature was not, at the time of
its occurrence, subject to uninhibited reporting and
subsequent investigation, which might have resulted
in broad and timely dissemination of the safety
message issued by the canier to its own flight crews.
(National T m q m k t i ~ n
and Safety Board, 1975, p.
29)
THE AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM
Following the United incident and the subsequent TWA
accident, the FAA realized that they could not have a
policeman on every comer and an informant in every airline.
A creative plan for drawing out the self-incrim.inating incident
information was introduced to the aviation community. The
idea was somewhat revolutionary for the time but may have
been a derivative of the "whistle blowers" legislation directed
at drawing out abuses in the environmental area and the
militrny industrial complex. The key ingredient of the FAA's
initiative was that any airmen (including air tr&c controller7
aviation certitied mechanic, etc.) who voluntarily sent in
incident infnmatiun to the FAA within 10 days of an incident
would be granted immunity from any penalties that may be
imposed after an investigation of the incident took place.
However, timing for the project was awkward. The Vietnam
War had deeply divided the country. The only thing the public
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could agree on was that they all had a deep distrust of
government In this co&ontational environment, the aviation
community, led by the AOPA (Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association)and &PA (Airline Pilots Association), soundly
rejected this first initiative. The FAA had to deal with the
issue of trust,or lack thereof. Under the proposed plan, evely
reported incident would be investigated and appropriate
enforcement action taken. After the enforcement action was
taken, the airman would get immunity from the penalty. The
e n f i i e n t action would remain indefinitely on the airman's
record in Oklahoma City. The risk was too high for the benefit
gained to the airman. The wall of silence remained
immovable.
Fortunately, the U.S. commercial aviation industry was
genuinely safety-minded for many self-serving reasons.
Airline pilots had a great deal of self-interest when it came to
safety; after all, they were the first ones to the scene of any
airline accident. Airlines also realized that dead passengers
and destroyed airplanes made great headlines but were bad for
business. Airplane manufacturers like Boeing and Douglas
also knew that broken airplanes created a feeding frenzy for
American Bar Association members.
As with any protracted negotiation, there is a point where
sameone finally comes up with a creative solution that meets
most of the needs of all at the table. The missing keystone to
the FAA's safety arch was respondent anonymily. Someone
wisely suggested ifthe FAA were genuinely interested in only
obtaining more safety information and not simply wanting to
drop the hammer on more airmen, then this issue could be
solved by an independent third party coming to the table. The
"honest broke?' tmned out to be the National Aeronautics and
Space A e a t i o n (NASA).
The final agreement between the parties came together in
this way (FAA, 1997):
The FAA contracted with NASA basically to
operate the FAA's Aviation Safety Reporting
Program (ASRP). NASA called its part of the
partnership th8Aviation Safety Reporting
System7' (ASRS). In the end, NASA
subcontracted the actual operation of the
program out to Battelle Memorial Institute in
Columbus, Ohio. However, most aviators kept
calling the incident reporting document "the
NASA form."
The crucial position of respondent anonymity
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was assured by NASA's involvement. A pilot
reporting an incident would have any iden-g
i n f d o n lamdered fiom the report before it was
passed along to the FAA. Consequently, in nearly all
cases, the FAA did not have enough identification
information to go and investigate the reported
incidents. They had the safety information, but not
the specific pilot or airline identification, which was
essential for enforcement action. The FAA still had
to rely on its traditional means of enforcement
through informants and spot inspections. The
aviation coxnmwas so paranoid about this issue
that the FAA promulgated Federal Aviation
Regulation (FAR) 91.25, which specifically
prohibited the FAA fiom using any information on
the ASRS form for enforcement purposes (FAA,
1995). To fuaher illustrate the importance and
effectiveness of the "nspndent anonymity" concept,
one needed only to look at a recently published FAA
notice to proposed rule-making: "Protection of
Voluntarily Submitted Information" (FAA, 1999).
This proposed Federal Aviation Regulation referred
to data-sharing programs (called ASAPs), in which
persons in the aviation community, such as air
carrier operators, would voluntarily share with the
FAA information related to safety. An impediment
to further development of these programs was the
reluctance of people to share information that, when
in the hands of a government agency, may be
required to be released to the public through the
Freedom of I d d o n Act or other means. Clearly,
if the privacy of the shared information were
guaranteed the effectiveness of these data-sharing
programs would increase.
Pilots who used the ASRS were granted immunity
or a waiver h m any penalties that arose fiom any
subsequent FAA e n f i t action. If convicted,
the violation would be reported on the pilot's
r e a r 4 but he or she would not have to serve the
proposed suspension or pay the h e . However, the
FAA flatly stated i
h
tthere would be no immunity if
the incident was caused by a deliberate act of the
airman, was criminal in nature, or resulted in an
accident.
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Airmen had 10days h m the date of the incident
to file a report. The FAA did not want to give a
negltgent pilot the benefit of immunity fiom a
penalty if the ahman filed a report only after the
incident happened to be investigated some weeks or
months later. Subsequent enforcement actions by the
FAA have indicated that they have been very strict
in the interpretation of the 10-dayfiling period.
A key conditionof this social contract was that an
airman could not take advantage of the immunity or
waiver ofpenally more than once every 5 years. This
did not prohibit the filing of numerous incident
reports, but an airman could exercise the immunity
provision only once, and then he or she would lose
the immunity for the 5 subsequent years. This
obviously was introduced to reduce the recidivism
rates.
FILING AN ASRS REPORT
As a social conthe ASRS has worked remarkably well.
Since its inception in 1975, over 420,000 incident reports
have been filed, and c m t monthly reports range &om 3,000
to 4,000. NASA employs about 15 former airline pilots, air
t r a c controllers, flight attendants, and mechanics to do the
initial and subsequent in-depth analyses of the incoming
incident reports (Yodice, 1999). The ASRS acts on the
information contained in these reports. It idenfifies system
problems and disseminates the information through its
CALLBACK newsletter, its Directline journal, and research
studies. In fact, the ASRS database is a public repository,
which serves the needs of all agencies and organizations
involved in the promotion of aviation safety. The following is
an overview of how NASA processes an incoming incident
report:
After an incident report is received at NASA's
Ames Research Center at Moffet Field, California,
it is date stamped. Normally, the postmark is the
relevant date stamp used for the 10-day filing
period; however, if it is missing, the NASA stamp
becomes crucial.
The report is passed on to an analyst for initial
screening. The analyst can contact the reporting
airman, since the home telephone number is
included m the top portion of the report. Sometimes
clarification is needed to fully analyze the nature of
the incident.
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Reports involving accidents andlor criminal activity
are passed on to the NTSB andfor the U.S.
Attorney's offices with the airman's identdication
intact.
If a clear and immediate safety issue is raised, the
data are immediately passed on to the FAA and the
NTSB by way of an "Alert Bulletin." NASA
removes the identification of all the parties in the
Alert Bulletin. A good example of this concerns
Boemg 737 airliners. If NASA receives any reports
about rudder malfunctions on this particular aircraft,
it immediately issues an Alert Bulletin. This aircraft
has been involved in several fatal accidents
invohiug suspected uncommanded rudder
excursions. Recently, the NTSB announced the
probable cause of two of these accidents to be an
uncontrolled rudder reversal. However, the different
agencies, as well as the manufacturer, are still
stumped as to the actual cause of these accidents;
therefore, they want to get a l l the possible incident
information involving the B-737 to assist them in
preventing future occurrences (McKenq 1999).
Reports of a less time-sensitive nature are analyzed
and grouped or coded into various categories in the
database.
At this PO& the analyst launders the report of any
identification clues. The top portion of the form is
used by the airman for his or her return address and
telephone contact number. This top portion is
removed along with the date stamp and returned by
regular mail to the airman. This becomes the
airman's proof of reporting the incident if
subsequent enforcement action is taken.
Atter all the relevant safety data have been extracted
from the report, it is destroyed. The only evidence
that the report ever existed remains in the hands of
the reporter to be possibly used at some future date.
Finally, contrary to what many airmen may suspect, the
filing of a report with NASA concerning an incident or
occurrenceinvolving a violation of the FARs is considered by
the FAA to be indicative of a constructive attitude.

AN AVIATION SAFETY SUCCESS STORY
As the program enters its 25th year, we should ask
ourselves: Why has the ASRS worked so well? The FAA has
to take some major credit for the success. The govemment
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leadership in the early 1970s was genuinely interested in
aviation safety. They chose to initiate a carefully structured
balancing act between safety concerns
and
regulatorylenforcement policy. They came to some of the
following conclusions, which prompted the novel approach:
The public was not about to confess altruistically to
each and every negligent safety violation. If
something was going to elicit the required safety
information, it needed to have a very strong selfinterest component to it.
With a limited number of enforcement officezs
(about 4,000 aviation safety inspectors nationwide),
the FAA could not put a cop on every corner. In
umtrast, the New Yo& Police Department has over
44,000 policemen (NYPD,1998). The city could
literally place a cop on every street comer.
While e n f i i e n t was not the goal of the ASRS, it
was clearly evident that strong enforcement was the
necessary motive force needed to flush out the
incident reports. If pilots knew that the incident
would never be detected by the FAA, they would be
less inclined to report it. The fear of detection was
and is the main underlying force for the entire
program. When effective enforcement is augmented
by a self-serving immunity provision, the incident
informationfloods in. When the incident information
flows, accidents, with the resultant pain and
suffering, are avoided.
What does the ASRS tell us about professional ethics in the
aviation industry? Airmen are a very well educated, highly
trained, and well paid group in a very high technology area of
our society. Notwithstanding a l l these positive qualities, this
group of professionals will not altruistically and voluntarily
step forward and report safety violations that may impugn
their professional competence and threaten their livelihood.
The FAA's Manager of the Aviation Safety Reporting
Program in Washington D.C. recently reported that the
Stanford University Health Sciences Center showed a great
deal of interest in implementing something similar to the
ASRS in the healthcare field (M. Blazy, personal
communication, June 16, 1999). Medical authorities are
starting to realize that thousands of safety incidents go
musported among healthcare practitioners. They also realize
that there is an impenetrable wall of silence. While most
pilots' mistakes are written up in the next day's newspaper,
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doctors get to quietly bury theirs.
Clearly in the health care industry the threat of enforcement
and the sanctions associated with violations and incidents are
somewhat different from what we are used to in aviation. In
fact, many medical centers and insurance companies have
been trying to monitor the incidence of adverse outcomes in
surgery cases and are looking for opportunities for early
intervention in other medical interventions. These
organizationsfeel that both the patient outcome and the claim
outcome can be favorably influenced by early, appropriate
intervention. They therefore encourage surgeons to call in
incident reports. They also remind them that while there is no
penalty for making an incident report, there may be a penalty
for failing to do so. Another incentive for participation in
incident reporting programs by health care providers could be
lower malpractice iusurance rates. Furthermore, just as with
the ASRS, respondent anonymity is a key ingredient to a
successful program. Finally, several specialized medical
incident reporting systems have been in operation in other
countries. A case in point is the Critical Incident Reporting
System at the University of Basel, Swiaerland . This program
focuses on incident reporting in the field of anesthesiology
(Helmreich, Schaefer, 1994). One has to realize though that
regardless of the field, there has to be a self-serving immunity
provision to make the progam work.
CONCLUSION
The question of ethical behavior among our educated elite
cannot be answered in a positive way. No one wants to take
reqomiiility for his or her negative actions today. To use an
old hockey expressb, "everyone wants to skate" or dodge the

consequences of their advertent or inadvertent actions. The
to recognize or enforce ethical or moral standards
law reamong our professional or political elite, so each responsible
group in society must attempt to overcome this natural
tendency to "skate," especially when public safety issues are
involved. Nowhere is this more important than in the fields of
healthcare and commercial aviation.
The ASRS, through compromise and an appeal to selfinterest, does a remarkably good job of eliciting this crucial
information in a largely unethical society. The results speak
for themselves. Americans enjoy the safest public air
transportation system in the world. Last year was the safest
year in airline history in this country; no major U.S. airline
suffered a fatal accident in 1998. The ASRS program
undoubtedly contributed in some degree to this outstanding
safety record.
Future challenges in the area of incident reporting will
include the design of more sophisticatedtools to review and
a d y e the data generated by the incident reporting systems.
Researchers also need to develop more specific
methodologies to capture and analyze human factors
i n f d o n . Unless continued progress is made in these areas
the usefulness of incident data gathering will become
questionable. However, none of these technical
recommendations have any meaning without the overall
integrity of the reporting system. In fact, failure to safeguard
the anonymity and the procedures associated with the ASRS
or any other incident reporting system can result in long-term
tragedy (=accidents) and a violation of public trust.0
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